Review of Financial Studies, June 2015, v. 28, iss. 6, pp. 1701-36.

卖空行为的无形之手👩‍⚖️：卖空会约束盈余管理吗🧑🏻‍🦯‍➡️？

作者：Massimo Massa (INSEAD), Bohui Zhang (School of Banking and Finance, UNSW Business School), Hong Zhang (PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University and INSEAD)

摘要：本文假设卖空对经理人的约束作用会使他们减少盈余管理🤷🏼‍♀️。通过使用2002至2009年间33个国家公司层面的卖空数据🚅，我们发现卖空威胁与盈余管理间显著的负相关性👼🏽♟。基于工具变量和外生监管实验的测试提供了卖空行为和盈余管理间存在因果关系的证据🫵🏿。本文的结论说明卖空可以作为一种外部治理机制对经理人产生约束作用🧚🏻。

The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?

Massimo Massa (INSEAD), Bohui Zhang (School of Banking and Finance, UNSW Business School), Hong Zhang (PBC School of Finance, Tsinghua University and INSEAD)

ABSTRACT

We hypothesize that short selling has a disciplining role vis-à-vis firm managers that forces them to reduce earnings management. Using firm-level short-selling data for thirty-three countries collected over a sample period from 2002 to 2009, we document a significantly negative relationship between the threat of short selling and earnings management. Tests based on instrumental variable and exogenous regulatory experiments offer evidence of a causal link between short selling and earnings management. Our findings suggest that short selling functions as an external governance mechanism to discipline managers.

原文链接🌈：

http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/28/6/1701.abstract

翻译：黄怡文