The Review of Financial Studies, Volume 31, Issue 2, 1 February 2018

共同基金经理的投资技能是否得到支付

作者：M Ibert(Stockholm School of Economics)

R Kaniel(University of Rochester)

S Van Nieuwerburgh(New York University Stern School of Business)

R Vestman(Stockholm University)

摘要：共同基金经理的薪酬对于理解资产委托中的代理摩擦至关重要。我们在瑞典共同基金经理的薪酬上收集了一个独特的注册数据集。我们发现薪酬与收入之间存在一种凹的关系👇🏽，这与投资者如何赔偿基金公司(公司)形成了鲜明的对比🧑‍🍼。我们还发现，即使考虑到业绩对收入的间接影响，薪酬对业绩的敏感度也出奇地低。公司层面的固定效应、收入和利润为薪酬增加了大量的解释力。

Are Mutual Fund Managers Paid for Investment Skill?

M Ibert(Stockholm School of Economics)；R Kaniel(University of Rochester)；S Van Nieuwerburgh(New York University Stern School of Business)🏖；R Vestman(Stockholm University)

ABSTRACT

Compensation of mutual fund managers is paramount to understanding agency frictions in asset delegation. We collect a unique registry-based dataset on the compensation of Swedish mutual fund managers. We find a concave relationship between pay and revenue, in contrast to how investors compensate the fund company (firm). We also find a surprisingly weak sensitivity of pay to performance, even after accounting for the indirect effects of performance on revenue. Firm-level fixed effects, revenues, and profits add substantial explanatory power for compensation.

原文链接🏌🏼‍♂️：https://academic.oup.com/rfs/article-abstract/31/2/715/4110801?redirectedFrom=fulltext

翻译：黄涛