FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, OCTOBER 2018

代理顾问对公司的实际影响

作者🫗：Paul Calluzzo (Queen's University-Smith School of Business),

Evan Dudley (Queen's University-Smith School of Business)

摘要🤹🏽‍♂️：本文研究了代理顾问（PA）对公司投票结果、政策和价值的影响。我们用股东遵循PA建议的历史倾向程度来衡量PA的影响。PA的影响增加了PA对代理投票结果和公司政策建议的影响🚵🏿‍♂️🧳。当股东在没有代理顾问的情况下有私人动机从事成本高昂的研究时，PA影响既不危害也不有利于股东价值。然而，在股东分散的公司中，PA的影响可以增加价值🤫💁🏻‍♂️。我们的结论与代理顾问和大股东获取信息能力竞争的理论结果一致⭐️。

The real effects of proxy advisors on the firm

Paul Calluzzo (Queen's University-Smith School of Business), Evan Dudley (Queen's University-Smith School of Business)

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the influence of proxy advisors (PA) on firm voting outcomes, policies, and value. We measure PA influence with shareholders' historical propensity to follow PA recommendations. PA influence increases the impact of PA recommendations on proxy voting outcomes and firm policies. When shareholders have private incentives to engage in costly research in the absence of a proxy advisor, PA influence neither harms nor benefits shareholder value. However, at firms with dispersed shareholders PA influence can increase value. Our findings are consistent with theories of voting in which proxy advisors compete with private information acquisition efforts by large shareholders.

原文链接👨🏿‍🦱：https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/fima.12251

翻译：董宇佳