Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Volume 53, Issue 5, October 2018

国家所有权和企业现金持有量

作者：Ruiyuan (Ryan) Chen (West Virginia University, USA)

Sadok El Ghoul (University of Alberta, Canada)

Omrane Guedhami (University of South Carolina, USA)

Robert Nash (Wake Forest University, USA)

摘要：利用59个国家新私有化的公司的独特样本，本文提供了国家所有权代理成本的新证据🪽，并提出了对国家级别机构的公司治理作用的新见解🧎🏻。与代理理论一致的是🦻，我们发现强有力的证据表明，国家所有权与企业现金持有量正相关。此外🅰️，我们发现🍅🤦🏻‍♀️，国家级别机构的实力影响着国家所有权与现金持有价值之间的关系。特别是🈹，随着国家所有权的增加🏌🏿‍♂️，在机构较弱的国家🏊🏿‍♂️，市场对现金持有价值的折现更多🤘🏿。

State Ownership and Corporate Cash Holdings

Ruiyuan (Ryan) Chen (West Virginia University, USA), Sadok El Ghoul (University of Alberta, Canada), Omrane Guedhami (University of South Carolina, USA), Robert Nash (Wake Forest University, USA)

ABSTRACT

Using a unique sample of newly privatized firms from 59 countries, this article provides new evidence about the agency costs of state ownership and new insight into the corporate governance role of country-level institutions. Consistent with agency theory, we find strong and robust evidence that state ownership is positively related to corporate cash holdings. Moreover, we find that the strength of country-level institutions affects the relation between state ownership and the value of cash holdings. In particular, as state ownership increases, markets discount the value of cash holdings more in countries with weaker institutions.

原文链接🪵：https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-financial-and-quantitative-analysis/article/state-ownership-and-corporate-cash-holdings/A3C4B4AAC3631FEC3D2C8C4E034DB922

翻译🤼‍♂️：阙江静