一🌪、主讲学生与论文题目：

1. 武竞雄（2017级博士生）⚡️：Loan Sales in China: an Alternative Way of Shadow Banking Financing

2. 王科（2017级博士生）🧛‍♂️：CEO Career Concerns and Risk-Taking: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Design

二、时间🤵🏿：2022年10月15日（周六）下午14:00-16:00

三、地点💅🏼：腾讯会议

四、点评与讨论教师：

王盈 凯发平台 副教授

夏聪 凯发平台 助理教授

陈宇子 凯发平台 助理教授

五🫱🏽、主持人：王盈 凯发平台 副教授

六、论文摘要

1. Loan Sales in China: an Alternative Way of Shadow Banking Financing

Both loan sales and shadow banking have been rising in China. Using proprietary and hand-collected transactional-level data on loan sales and entrusted (and trust) loans in China, this paper shows that loan sale substitutes entrusted (and trust) loans, suggesting that loan sale is an alternative way of financing through shadow banking. The effect is more pronounced for small-and-median-sized firms and local government financing platforms. The investigations also show that borrowers’ fundamental risks have been prices in loan sales.

2. CEO Career Concerns and Risk Aversion: Evidence from Regression Discontinuity Design

We use Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to identify the causal impact of CEO career concerns on corporate risk aversion behavior. Using the ex-ante predicted dismissal probability as a proxy for career concerns, we exploit narrowly missing the Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) target as an exogenous shock to CEO career concerns in the RDD setting. Our results indicate that career-concerned CEOs become more risk-averse in the subsequent year than otherwise similar CEOs without such concerns. Further analysis of corporate policies shows that career-concerned CEOs make fewer investments, hold more cash, and treat shareholders better. This effect is more pronounced for insecure CEOs with shorter tenure in their position and more salary deferred.

备注🤾‍♂️：中财-蒂尔堡项目闭门论坛，仅限项目师生参加